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In this paper we study the resilience of peer-to-peer networks to preferential attacks. We define a
network model and experiment with three different simple repairing algorithms, out of which the
so called ‘2nd neighbor’ rewiring algorithm is found to be effective and plausible for keeping a large
connected component in the network, in spite of the continuous attacks. While our motivation
comes from peer-to-peer file sharing networks, we believe that our results are more general and
applicable in a wide range of networks. All this work was done as a student project in the Complex
Systems Summer School 2004, organized by the Santa Fe Institute in Santa Fe, NM, USA.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been an increasing interest in the field of
complex networks recently. Describing complex systems
as graphs has proven to be an effective approach and it is
now widely adopted. Network analysis and modeling has
contributed to understanding mechanisms and organiza-
tion principles of various systems (Albert and Baraba´si,
2002; Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2002; Newman, 2003).
In computer science much attention has turned to peer-
to-peer computer networks, sometimes abbreviated as
P2P networks. In a peer-to-peer computer network, ev-
ery (node) computer has the same capabilities and re-
sponsibilities, there are no distinguished nodes. This is
in contrast to client/server architectures, where the roles
(and usually also the capabilities) of the client and server
nodes differ.
Many peer-to-peer computer networks provide file-
sharing services (but not all of them, see the work of
Milojicic et al. (2002)), the owners of the network nodes
intend to share their files with the other node owners
in the same network. It is observed that many nodes of
these file sharing networks distribute illegal content, most
often copyrighted audio and video files. The Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) as a represen-
tative of the U.S. recording industry investigates the ille-
gal distribution of sound recordings. The RIAA tries to
identify the file sharing network nodes distributing large
amount of illegal content in order to shut them down (ie.
removing them from the network).
The motivation of the present work is to find out
whether the nodes can apply a simple local strategy to
keep the peer-to-peer network in a working state, or by
continuously removing the most active nodes from the
network, the attacker can effectively prevent the network
from fulfilling its function. By local strategy we mean an
algorithm which uses only a constant amount of informa-
tion, regardless of the size of the network. Although our
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motivation was specific, we believe that our model and
results are more general and widely applicable to various
other networks as well.
The outline of this report is as follows. In Section II
we very briefly discuss the literature closely related to the
project. In Section III we define our network model, and
justify the model’s assumptions. In Section IV we present
three different defensive strategies, and their performance
analysis. Finally, in Section V we give our conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been some work done on measuring the
resilience of different network structures, especially re-
silience of scale-free networks to random failure and tar-
geted attack (Albert et al., 2000). Here failure means re-
moving nodes randomly from the network, and targeted
attack means removing the high degree nodes from the
network. Albert and her co-workers showed that scale-
free networks are not vulnerable to random failure but
very vulnerable to targeted attacks. A similar approach
was applied by Broder et al. (2000). Callaway et al.
(2000) studied percolation, which is closely related to net-
work resilience, on random graphs with arbitrary degree
distributions. They used generating function methods to
solve bond and site percolation problems, in which the
occupation probability was a given function of the vertex
degree.
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
A. How to attack a network?
A network attack, ie. node removal from the network,
can cause various levels of damage to the structure (and
function also) of the network. In the classic work on
network tolerance Albert et al. (2000) studied how the
diameter of the network changes after 1) removing nodes
randomly and 2) removing preferentially higher degree
nodes. The intuitive result was that scale-free networks
2are very resilient to random node removal (ie. a failure)
and not at all resilient to preferential node removal (ie.
a targeted attack).
In our model we assume that the attacker tries to in-
flict as much damage as possible and removes the higher
degree nodes from the network. These nodes are not
very difficult to find, even if the attacker doesn’t know
the structure of the whole network (Cohen et al., 2003).
Let us assume that the degree distribution of the net-
work is given by pk(k = 0, . . . , n − 1) where n is the
number of nodes in the network. Thus the probability
that a randomly chosen node in the network has degree
k is pk. Now, if we choose a random neighbor of the ran-
domly chosen node (let us assume that it has one), the
probability that this second node has degree k is pro-
portional to kpk, since the more edges this second node
has, the higher the probability is that it will be selected.
(Here we assume that there are no correlations between
node degrees in the network, the assortativity coefficient
(Newman, 2002) is zero.) The same method is described
by Cohen et al. (2003), in a different context.
In our model we assume that the attacker uses this
method to find the nodes with high degree in the network.
B. The model assumptions
We consider only undirected networks. In real peer-to-
peer networks, this is not always the case, most of them
are directed. The reason for assuming mutual connec-
tions (undirectedness) is simplicity. The defensive strate-
gies are more difficult to define on directed networks, and
also keeping the number of edges constant (another as-
sumption, comes later) is more difficult.
The network attacks are carried out in the way de-
scribed in the previous section. A random neighbor of a
randomly chosen node is removed with all its edges from
the network. If the randomly chosen node has no neigh-
bors at all, no node is removed. This method tends to
remove the hubs (ie. high degree nodes) from the net-
work.
We keep the number of nodes in the network constant.
The reason for this is partly practical: we wanted to
study the long term behavior of the model and didn’t
want the network to shrink to a very small size. The
other reason is that we assumed that there are new nodes
joining to the network. The rate of the node removal
and the rate of the new nodes joining are the same in the
model, and this result.
Not only the number of nodes, but also the number
of edges is kept constant in the model. This assump-
tion is made because in real networks edges have costs
associated with them. A fixed number of edges means
fixed cost for maintaining the network. We wanted the
network to repair itself without increasing this cost.
In order to keep the number of edges constant, after
the attack the same number of edges are added to the
network as the number of edges deleted with the attacked
node. One edge is given to the newly added node, it will
have degree one, and connects to a random node in the
network. The remaining edges are given to the former
neighbors of the attacked node (we will call these affected
nodes in the following). While adding the new edges,
we don’t check for self-loops (a node connects to itself)
or multiple edges, in some cases they are even needed
to keep the number of edges constant. We can look at
self-loops as spare edges for the nodes, they can be used
later to create a “real” connection. Multiple edges can
be considered as stronger edges between two nodes.
The different defensive strategies for the network are
defined as the methods the new edges are added to the
affected nodes. A defensive strategy is an algorithm used
by an affected node to decide which node it will connect
to instead of the lost (attacked) node. The information a
node has about the structure of the network is considered
to be part of the algorithm. Sometimes we call these
strategies rewiring strategies, because the affected nodes
rewire from the attacked node to another one.
This is a discrete time model. The time steps of the
simulation is defined by the attacks, there is one attack in
each time step. Only the affected nodes are active in the
network (the newly added node can also be considered
active), the other nodes don’t initiate or remove connec-
tions. The affected nodes react to the attack by creating
new edges.
There are various structural properties of networks
considered to be important for their function. For ef-
ficient information flow, the characteristic path length or
the diameter of the network should be small; if the edges
have large costs, the redundancy of the network should
be minimal, etc. In this study we’ve focused on a very
basic structural property: the connectedness of the net-
work. It is clear that in order to function, a peer-to-peer
network should be connected. (For efficient function of
course usually other properties are needed.) More pre-
cisely we’ve considered the size of the largest connected
component of the network to compare the rewiring strate-
gies, after a large number of attacks, when the network
can be assumed to be in a steady state.
IV. RESULTS
A. The random rewiring strategy
Let us first consider a very simple (but promising) pos-
sible defensive strategy for the nodes. Here we do not
mean a strategy which is easy to implement, but one
which is easy to handle in simulations or even in analyt-
ical calculations.
The random rewiring strategy is indeed completely
random. The affected nodes rewire to a randomly cho-
sen node in the network (including also the newly added
node).
It is known since Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959) that a ran-
dom graph has a giant connected component with proba-
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FIG. 1 The degree distributions of a random graph (blue
line, circles) and a random graph after attacks and random
rewiring repair (red line, squares). The plot shows that the
random rewiring strategy does not keep a random graph ran-
dom. This is because the attacks remove preferentially the
nodes with high degree.
bility 1 if the average node degree in the graph is greater
than 1. We also know that when the average node degree
is 1 there is a phase transition in the system: the proba-
bility of having a giant cluster jumps from probability 0
to probability 1.
These facts have strong implications for our model. So
long as we can keep the network as a random graph, we
will have a large connected component. In the model we
keep both the number of nodes and the number of edges
constant, thus the average node degree is also constant.
So if we can be sure that the random rewiring strategy
keeps the network in the random graph state, and we
start with a random graph with an average degree high
enough, the network will have a giant connected compo-
nent even after the attacks. Note that starting with a
random graph is a quite strong assumption which is usu-
ally not true in real peer-to-peer networks which show
power-law degree distributions (Ripeanu et al., 2002).
So we’ve investigated whether the attacks and the ran-
dom rewiring strategy keeps a random graph in the ran-
dom state. Fig. 1 shows that the degree distribution of
a random graph changes after the attacks and the ran-
dom rewiring repair, the graph is not a random graph
any more.
Even if the attacked network is not a random graph,
it’s degree distribution is similar to a random graph so
the random rewiring strategy is still promising. Fig. 3
indeed shows that it performs very well.
As the structure of the random graph changes by using
the random rewiring strategy, it is an interesting question
whether the giant component’s size in attacked graphs
converges to a steady state and if yes, whether there is
a phase transition in the size of the largest component
in the attacked network controlled by the average degree
of the nodes. Although we don’t give a proof for the
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FIG. 2 Phase transitions in random graphs (green line,
squares) and attacked random graphs (read line, circles). Fur-
ther calculations are needed to prove the existence of the tran-
sition in the attacked graph. The transition threshold for the
attacked network seems to be higher.
existence of the phase transition, according to the ex-
perimental results shown on Fig. 2 there is also a phase
transition in the attacked network, for which the phase
transition threshold seems to be different than the stan-
dard degree 1 threshold in the random graphs. Further
calculations are needed to calculate the exact position of
the phase transition.
The random rewiring strategy is efficient, however it is
not plausible in real networks. In order to choose a node
from the whole network randomly, every single node has
to know every other node in the network. This means
that the nodes have complete information (almost com-
plete, only the nodes have to be known, the edges don’t)
of the whole network which is usually not true in real net-
works, especially not in peer-to-peer networks. We also
investigate other strategies, which are implementable in
practice.
B. The greedy rewiring strategy
The second rewiring strategy we’ve analyzed is a local
algorithm. Every node is considered having only local in-
formation (it knows its neighbors), and behaving greed-
ily, it tries to connect to a good node in its neighborhood.
A node is considered good if it has many edges.
More precisely the greedy strategy is defined as fol-
lows: the affected node chooses a random neighbor and
connects to the best neighbor of it. The best neighbor is
the neighbor with the highest degree. If the affected node
has no neighbors or second neighbors, the node creates a
self loop in order to keep the number of edges constant.
The affected nodes reconnect in random order.
This strategy is clearly local and easy to implement
in practice. It is trivial however that it is not able to
keep the network connected. This is because this strategy
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FIG. 3 The performance of the random (blue line, circles)
and greedy (red line, squares) strategies starting with a ran-
dom graph. The plot shows the ratio of the number of nodes
in the largest connected component to the network size. If
the random rewiring is applied, the network reserves the size
of the largest component, even if the structure of the initial
random graph changes. The greedy strategy always ends up
with completely disconnected nodes after sufficiently many
attacks.
cannot reconnect a network which has fallen into two
separate components as the result of an attack. In the
steady state the network consists almost exclusively of
isolated nodes. For the actual performance, see Fig. 3.
C. The ‘2nd neighbor’ rewiring
The third strategy is motivated by the failure of the
local greedy and the success of the global random strat-
egy. This third strategy uses more information than the
greedy rewiring, but it is still intended to be local.
The ‘2nd neighbor’ rewiring involves keeping a list of
all its second neighbors by every node in the network.
This list is used for an affected node to rewire to a former
neighbor of the attacked node. After the rewiring, the
lists of the nodes are updated.
The performance of the 2nd neighbor strategy is shown
on Fig. 4. The plot shows that in the short run this strat-
egy performs quite poorly, there is a steep decrease in the
size of the giant component. In the long run however the
performance is much better, the size of the largest com-
ponents starts to increase and although it does not reach
the original size in the starting random graph and there
are also quite big fluctuations in it, its value is quite high.
According to Fig. 4 the performance of the 2nd neigh-
bor strategy is adequate in the long run. However, it
is unclear why this strategy is able to keep the network
connected. We do not know what structural property
changes in the graph in the decreasing regime, what
structural changes initiate the increase, and what kind of
network we get in the end. What we believe is the follow-
ing. The 2nd neighbor strategy restructures the network
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FIG. 4 The performance of the ‘2nd neighbor’ strategy. As
before, the plot shows the changes in the ratio of the largest
cluster in the network. In the short run, there is a steep
decrease in the size of the largest component, but after that,
the largest component starts to grow and reaches a quite high
level. The 2nd neighbor strategy performs well in the long
run. Also note the quite big fluctuations, even after the curve
somewhat levels off.
to be resilient even against targeted attacks. In the first
phase of the restructuring, the size of the largest compo-
nent decreases, but as soon as some structural property
is achieved, the largest component will be very resilient
to the attacks and remains connected. This strong large
component is also able to grow because the new nodes
attach to it with significant probability. Still there are
some weak parts in this component, which can be broken
and separated by the attack, this causes the large fluctu-
ations. In the final phase the network reaches a state of
dynamic equilibrium, where new nodes are constantly at-
tached to the large connected component, but also some
small parts are broken from it.
Further work is needed to investigate how the struc-
tural properties of the network change as a result of the
attacks and the rewiring.
It is an interesting question if there is also a phase
transition in the networks resulted by the 2nd neighbor
strategy by increasing the average degree of the nodes.
We’ve addressed this question, and made experiments,
for which the results are on Fig. 5. The results show that
indeed there might be a phase transition in the system
around average degree 2, but more work is needed to
prove the existence of the phase transition. If this kind
of transition really exists in the system, that means that
networks having high enough average node degree and
nodes applying the 2nd neighbor rewiring algorithm are
very resilient to attacks.
Let us address the question of the amount of infor-
mation required by the 2nd neighbor rewiring strategy.
Clearly, for a single node this is proportional to the num-
ber of second neighbors it has. Ideally we want every
node to have a constant number of second neighbors, in-
dependently of the size of the network; this is how a local
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FIG. 5 The performance of the 2nd neighbor strategy in the
function of the average node degree in the network. There
might be a phase transition in the network, where an infinite
giant component appears in infinite networks around average
node degree 2 with probability 1.
strategy was defined.
After some exploratory numerical simulations our im-
pression is that for networks without hubs the maximum
number of second neighbors grows much slower than the
network size, probably as the logarithm of it. For scale-
free networks however, as they tend to contain big hubs,
the required amount of information for a node is propor-
tional to the size of the whole network.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this report we have defined and analyzed a model for
describing the effect of attacks on peer-to-peer networks
and studying the efficiency of various defense mechanisms
for the network. We’ve defined three such mechanisms,
the random, greedy and second neighbor rewiring, and
conclude that the last one offers fair performance on the
long runs and seems to be implementable in practice.
For future work, the most important task lies in quan-
tifying the amount of information needed by the nodes
for the application of the 2nd neighbor rewiring strat-
egy in various networks. There are promising results by
Newman et al. (2001) using generating functions to give
the distribution in networks with arbitrary degree dis-
tributions. Also, more numerical experiments should be
conducted to find out how the number of second neigh-
bors scales with the network size for different networks.
It is also important to discover how the 2nd neigh-
bor algorithm restructures the network, what structural
properties change during the first (shrinking largest clus-
ter) and second (growing largest cluster) phase of the
simulation.
While to have a connected network is required for the
function of the network, sometimes it is not enough and
other structural properties are also needed. It is im-
portant to examine how the 2nd neighbor algorithm ef-
fects these, starting perhaps with the characteristic path
length of the network.
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